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Abstract
Tax rates on labor income, capital income and consumption￿ and the redistributive trans-
fers those taxes ￿nance￿ di⁄er widely across developed countries. Can majority-voting meth-
ods, applied to a calibrated growth model, explain that variation? The answer I ￿nd is yes,
and then some. In this paper, I examine a simple growth model, calibrated roughly to US
data, in which the political decision is over constant paths of taxes on factor income and
consumption, used to ￿nance a lump-sum transfer. I ￿rst look at outcomes under probabilis-
tic voting, and ￿nd that equilibria are extremely sensitive to the speci￿cation of uncertainty.
I then consider other ways to restrict the range of majority-rule outcomes, looking at the
model￿ s implications for the shape of the Pareto set and the uncovered set, and the existence
or non-existence of a Condorcet winner. Solving the model on discrete grid of policy choices,
I ￿nd that no Condorcet winner exists and that the Pareto and uncovered sets, while small
relative to the entire issue space, are large relative to the range of tax policies we see in data
for a collection of 20 OECD countries. Taking that data as the issue space, I ￿nd that none
of the 20 can be ruled out on e¢ ciency grounds, and that 10 of the 20 are in the uncovered
set. Those 10 encompass policies as diverse as those of the US, Norway and Austria. One can
construct a Condorcet cycle including all 10 countries￿tax vectors.
The key features of the model here, as compared to other models on the endogenous
determination of taxes and redistribution, is that the issue space is multidimensional and,
at the same time, no one voter type is su¢ ciently numerous to be decisive. I conclude that
the sharp predictions of papers in this literature may not survive an expansion of their issue
spaces or the allowance for a slightly less homogeneous electorate.
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1 Introduction and motivation
This paper was originally motivated by a claim, made in Peter Lindert￿ s book Growing Public:
Social Spending and Economic Growth Since the Eighteenth Century, that European welfare states,
which redistribute a much larger share of income than, say, the United States, su⁄er few, if any,
of the adverse consequences on the size of national output that economists might expect, because
the tax systems they use to ￿nance this redistribution are more e¢ cient￿ in particular, by relying
more heavily on the taxation of consumption, and less heavily on the taxation of income. The
Economist of April 1, 2004, summarized the argument, in an article discussing Lindert￿ s book:
The big European and Nordic welfare states are undoubtedly expensive. But their
economic costs are held down by the perhaps surprisingly e¢ cient tax systems with
which they are ￿nanced. Once the means of ￿nance are taken into account, they are
also less redistributive than you might expect.
Economic theory has a lot to say about e¢ cient systems of taxation. One guiding
principle is that it is better to tax consumption than income, because taxing what is
spent rather than what is earned does less damage to incentives to save. If wages are
taxed, and the interest on savings is taxed also, then anything saved out of your wages
is, in e⁄ect, taxed twice. Compared with the Americans, the Europeans place far more
of their tax burden on consumption than income.
Indeed, rates of taxation on consumption, labor income and capital income vary markedly
across developed countries. Table 1 reports estimates of average e⁄ective tax rates for a sample of
OECD countries, over the period 1990￿ 2000, taken from Carey and Rabesona [4]. The countries
in Table 1 are ordered by their tax rates on consumption, in increasing order. One could look at
tax rates for other periods or the estimates of other authors￿ Mendoza, Tesar and Razin [19], for
example￿ but the wide variety of observed policies would remain a feature of the data.
Given the variety of tax policies we see in Table 1, the sort of question I had in mind was
something like the following: Can we write down a fairly simple growth model which, when coupled
with a majority-voting mechanism that endogenously determines consumption and income taxes,
can rationalize the wide variety of tax policies we observe in terms of the exogenous structure of
the model economy￿ as a consequence of di⁄erences in technology, for example, or di⁄erences in
the initial distributions of wealth or earnings ability? One might also wonder￿ given that one of
the available policy instruments is a consumption tax￿ whether a reasonable model could deliver
a positive rate of capital income taxation as a politico-economic equilibrium. Why, in fact, do we
see taxes on income at all, given the availability of taxes on consumption, and the economist￿ s
2Consumption Labor income Capital income
United States 6.4 23.4 27.3
Japan 6.4 24.1 27.9
Switzerland 9.3 30.9 27.1
Australia 12.1 20.9 30.7
Germany 13.4 35 21.2
Canada 13.9 29.6 36.8
Italy 13.9 37.7 31
Spain 14.5 30.7 20
Belgium 15 41.3 32.7
France 15.1 40.5 33.2
Greece 15.5 34.9 12.9
United Kingdom 15.7 22.6 34
Korea 15.8 9.9 16.7
Austria 16.2 39.6 24.3
Netherlands 18 36.4 32.7
Finland 18.7 45 26
Sweden 19.8 49.6 35.7
Portugal 19.9 23.9 17.6
Denmark 20.6 39.9 39.5
Norway 25.7 36.2 24.7
Mean 15.3 32.6 27.6
Standard deviation 4.6 9.6 7.2
Standard deviation, percent of mean 30.4 29.4 26.2
Table 1: Average e⁄ective tax rates in a sample of OECD countries, 1990-2000, percent (Source:
Carey and Rabesona, 2002)
3￿ guiding principle￿that taxes on consumption are preferable, on e¢ ciency grounds, to taxes on
income?
It￿ s important for this sort of analysis that the taxes used to ￿nance redistribution are dis-
tortionary. Voting over how to divide a dollar, a pie or any ￿xed quantity of resources almost
necessarily leads to a lack of majority-rule equilibria, at least in pure strategies￿ any candidate
division of the pie can be defeated by an alternative division that shifts resources away from one
voter and towards the others. With distortionary taxes, however, the size of the pie is linked
to the manner in which it is allocated. If the distortionary e⁄ects of taxation are su¢ ciently
strong, there is some hope that the tools of majority voting, applied to a model economy, can
pin down a unique equilibrium outcome or, barring that, may at least result in a narrow range
of ￿ plausible￿outcomes. That consideration is, in fact, one justi￿cation for choosing the model
which I will elaborate below, the other main consideration being its simplicity. The model is not
the standard neoclassical growth model, but rather a two-sector AK model￿ a model in which
the capital-producing technology is linear, and in which taxes, in particular capital income taxes,
have potentially severe consequences for the size of the economic pie. I would conjecture that if
majority voting methods fail to pin down a narrow set of plausible outcomes in this model, the
results would only be less conclusive in a more standard model.
The model I work with in this paper is simpler in some respects than many models in the lit-
erature on endogenous taxation and redistribution￿ for example, the political decisions I consider
assume full commitment at date zero to constant paths of taxes￿ but it is more complicated in
one important respect: the issue space is multi-dimensional, consisting of taxes on capital income,
labor income and consumption, and, at the same time, the electorate is calibrated in such a way
that no single type of household constitutes a majority. Papers in this literature, which I survey
brie￿ y below, typically achieve determinant political equilibria by assuming either that the issue
space consists of a single tax parameter or that one group of voters is decisive in each election.
An issue space with three dimensions seems to be the minimal size for explaining Table 1.
And, even if one is primarily interested in explaining only cross-country di⁄erences in the size of
redistributive transfers￿ the size of the welfare state￿ Lindert￿ s claim suggests that the size of
transfers and the composition of ￿nancing are inextricably linked. Can one have a good theory
of cross-country di⁄erences in the size of transfers without explaining di⁄erences in tax systems?
The assumption that no household type is assumed decisive, on the other hand, is a modeling
choice, with which one might disagree. However, given that three of the last ￿ve U.S. presidential
winners have been elected with less than 50% of the popular vote￿ and that, outside of the U.S.,
strong third-parties seem to be the rule rather than the exception￿ exploring whether determinant
outcomes are readily obtained with a less-homogeneous electorate seems a worthwhile exercise.
With policies to be described by three tax rates￿ and the level of redistributive transfers being
determined by a government budget constraint, as will be described below￿ it seemed clear at
4the outset that the mechanism for generating political outcomes in the model would have to be
something other than simple Downsian two-party competition over tax policy platforms. Verifying
the conditions of the median voter theorem is a di¢ cult task in settings where the issue space
is multi-dimensional. In the context of the model I will elaborate below￿ a model that, while
simple in many respects, is su¢ ciently complicated that analytic expressions for individual policy
preferences cannot be obtained￿ verifying something like Plott￿ s [22] condition, for example, would
be impossible. My initial inclination, then, was to apply probabilistic voting, which seemed well-
suited to models with multidimensional issue spaces.1
To preview the main results, discussed in greater detail below, outcomes under probabilistic
voting proved fragile. In fact, for a loose calibration of the model, depending on whether the
(logistically distributed) random terms in agents￿preferences were additive or multiplicative, the
equilibrium tax vectors were not merely di⁄erent, but in fact orthogonal. For a more careful
calibration￿ the speci￿c parameter values are given in section 3￿ the outcomes under additive or
multiplicative random elements were no longer orthogonal, but nearly so. While one equilibrium
relied heavily on consumption and capital income taxes, the other had a zero consumption tax
rate and a very light capital income tax rate. While one had a 33% tax rate on labor income, the
other had a zero tax rate on labor income. While one resulted in transfers equal to 63% of GDP,
the other had transfers that were essentially zero.
Given the disparity in outcomes under the two speci￿cations of probabilistic voting, it seemed
natural to ask whether one or the other outcome was more appropriate according to more the-
oretically grounded criteria￿ for example, are one or both outcomes (or perhaps neither) in the
Pareto set, the set of alternatives that are not Pareto-dominated by other alternatives? While the
model described below treats the issue space as a subset of R3, for practical purposes the model
can only be solved computationally on a discrete, ￿nite grid of tax vectors. Given a ￿nite grid on
which the model is solved, does there exist a Condorcet winner￿ that is, an alternative which wins
all pairwise contests? Barring that, what does the model￿ s uncovered set look like?2 What I ￿nd,
for a particular parametrization of the model, solved on a discrete grid of tax vectors, is that: no
Condorcet winner exists, and while the Pareto and uncovered sets are small relative to the entire
issue space, they are both large relative to the range of observed outcomes summarized in Table
1. That is, most of the alternatives in Table 1 are within, or very close to, both the Pareto set
and uncovered set.
1Probabilistic voting is described in section 4.3.
2The uncovered set is de￿ned more precisely below. It is a subset of the Pareto set and contains the Condorcet
winner, if one exists. In two-candidate, majority-rule elections, a candidate ought to be reluctant to espouse a
platform outside the uncovered set￿ such platforms represent dominated strategies. In settings where a decision
is made amongst a ￿nite set of alternatives using an amendment procedure (alternative 1 faces alternative 2, the
winner faces 3, the winner of that faces 4, etc., until all alternatives are exhausted) the set of sophisticated voting
outcomes lies in the uncovered set. See Miller [20], Ordeshook [21] or Banks [1].
5Given the results of simulating the model, I turn speci￿cally to the data in Table 1. One
interpretation of the previous results is that without further structure on the political process,
beyond a basic assumption of majority voting, our model economy is as likely to adopt a tax policy
that looks like that of the U.S. as it is that of a European welfare state. As further con￿rmation
of this interpretation, I take the data from Table 1 as comprising the model￿ s issue space, and
calculate the model￿ s Pareto set and uncovered set given that restricted list of alternatives. The
Pareto set is the entire list of 20 alternatives. Of the 20 alternatives, 10 are in the uncovered set,
including countries like the U.S. and Japan, but also Austria and Norway. The uncovered set is
not reducible3, and, perhaps not surprisingly, given McKelvey [17], one can construct a Condorcet
cycle including all 10 uncovered alternatives.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model
economy￿ the choice problems faced by ￿rms and households, the government￿ s budget constraint
and the economy￿ s resource constraints￿ and characterizes balanced growth equilibria for a given,
constant set of taxes on capital income, labor income and consumption. Since the model can only
be solved computationally, I spend some time in section 3 describing the calibration of the model￿ s
parameters. In section 4, I present the model￿ s implication for political outcomes￿ equilibria under
probabilistic voting, the model￿ s Pareto set and the uncovered set. I also discuss the model￿ s
predictions when the issue space is taken to be the 20 tax vectors given in Table 1. I o⁄er some
concluding comments in section 5. Some of the derivations in the construction of balanced growth
equilibria and model calibration, as well as other analytical details, are relegated to an appendix,
which appears at the end of the paper. First, though, I brie￿ y survey some of the literature to
which the paper is related.
1.1 Related literature
This paper is related to several papers in the growing literature on the endogenous determination of
taxes and redistribution in dynamic economic models. Many of these models examine environments
that are richer, along some dimensions, than the environment I consider in this paper. These
models typically feature limited commitment to future tax rates, so political decisions must be
taken at regular intervals. In some, the economy￿ s distribution of wealth holdings can evolve in
complex ways, and the authors must exercise great care in tracking that evolution and its impact
on political outcomes. Most of the papers in this literature are simpler, though, in two important
respects￿ either the political decision is one-dimensional (a single income tax rate that determines
a transfer payment via the government￿ s budget constraint) or there is one household type in the
economy whose share in the population is greater than or equal to one half (so that majority
preferences are simply the preferences of that household type). The results in this paper are not
3Reducibility, discussed further below, would allow us narrow down the location of sophisticated voting outcomes
to a proper subset of the uncovered set.
6intended to diminish the work of these authors￿ the problems they tackle are di¢ cult enough on
their own terms￿ but simply to suggest that the sharp predictions for political equilibria that they
obtain might not survive an expansion of the set of available tax instruments or an allowance for
a less homogeneous electorate.
Krusell and Rios-Rull [13] extend Meltzer and Richard￿ s [18] static theory of the size of gov-
ernment to the dynamic setting of the neoclassical growth model with heterogeneous agents. In
their model there is a single ￿ at-rate tax on income used to ￿nance a lump-sum transfer. The
government follows a balanced budget, so a choice of tax rate implies a transfer payment, yielding
an issue space which is one-dimensional. Taxes are decided on every two periods, and are con-
stant between political decisions. The authors focus on Markov equilibria, with the distribution
of capital and the current tax rate as state variables. There are three types of agents and, with a
one-dimensional issue space, Krusell and Rios-Rull are able to verify computationally that agents￿
preferences over the tax rate are single-peaked. They are thus able to apply the median voter
theorem in a relatively straightforward way. Krusell and Rios-Rull take great care in calibrating
their model to match facts on the U.S. distributions of income and wealth. They ￿nd that the
total size of transfers predicted by the model is close to what we see in the data.
Krusell, Quadrini and Rios-Rull [12] extend the analytical and computational framework of
Krusell and Rios-Rull [13] to compare consumption tax systems and income tax systems under
majority voting. They study economies with only a consumption tax, only an income tax and
with both taxes together. While the latter case expands the issue space beyond one dimension, the
authors assume a population structure in which one household type is decisive￿ political outcomes
thus maximize the utility of that household type. Among other results, they ￿nd that systems
that rely on taxing income may yield higher steady state welfare compared to systems that rely on
taxing consumption. The additional distortions that come from taxing income act to reduce the
steady state size of government transfers in their model. When both types of taxes are allowed,
their median household chooses a positive consumption tax rate and a negative income tax rate;
they conclude that the consumption tax is being used to raise revenue while the income tax is
being used to mitigate some of the distortion associated with the consumption tax. In the model
I present below, I constrain all tax rates to be non-negative; allowing for possibly negative tax
rates on capital or labor income may be an interesting extension.
Hassler, Rodriguez Mora, Storesletten and Zilibotti [9] present a model with repeated voting
over redistributive taxation. The model features an overlapping generations structure in which
agents are identical in their ￿rst period of life, but have either high or low income in their second
period of life, depending on their draw of a random productivity variable. Investments made
by agents when young can increase the probability of their becoming successful when old. The
issue space in the model is one-dimensional￿ the political decision is the size of a lump-sum
redistribution, which implies a lump-sum tax. The tax is paid by all agents, but the bene￿t is
7received only by those who get the low-income draw. The electorate consists of the current old,
which are divided between high-income and low-income individuals. The fraction of low-income old
is a key state variable in their model, since it determines whether the decisive voter is a low-income
or high-income old agent. Since this fraction depends on investment undertaken when agents were
young, and the incentive to undertake investment is less the greater the level of redistribution,
Hassler et al.￿ s model features a self-reinforcing feedback from current redistributive policies to
future demand for redistribution. Their model has multiple equilibria, and makes a number of
interesting predictions regarding the persistence and potential fragility of the welfare state.
Hassler, Krusell, Storesletten and Zilibotti [10] extend Hassler et al. [9] to a model with a
richer set of agent types which features two layers of uncertainty￿ upon birth, agents are subject
to an ability shock which assigns a fraction of the cohort to be ￿ workers￿(who have the lowest
income) and the rest ￿ entrepreneurs￿ ; ￿ entrepreneurs￿then undertake a costly investment which
in￿ uences the probability of their being ￿ successful￿or ￿ unsuccessful￿in the second period of their
lives. Agents have preferences such that they are ex ante risk averse, but ex post risk neutral. Ex
ante risk aversion gives a rationale for positive transfers over and above any purely redistributive
concerns. As in [9], the model features a feedback from redistribution to e⁄ort choice, hence to
the distribution of ￿ success￿ , and thus to the demand for redistribution. Among other results, the
authors ￿nd that politically-determined redistribution in their model is larger and more persistent
than would be chosen by a social planner under commitment. This is a model with a complex
electorate. In the authors￿benchmark case, next period￿ s taxes are decided by the currently
young, but after both types of uncertainty have been resolved￿ so the electorate consists of agents
who will enter the subsequent period as either workers, unsuccessful entrepreneurs or successful
entrepreneurs. The authors also consider a case where both young and old are permitted to vote
over current bene￿ts. In order to facilitate the determination of unique political equilibria, the
authors adopt a form of probabilistic voting that results in an equilibrium bene￿t choice that, in
e⁄ect, maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function for the electorate.4
Lastly, in the literature on social choice, DeDonder [7] performs calculations similar in spirit
to those which I undertake in section 4.4. DeDonder considers a static model of redistribution in
which agents have quadratic utility functions over consumption, work e⁄ort and capital supplied
to the economy￿ s productive sector (which produces consumption using capital and labor as inputs
to a linear technology). The government taxes consumption and capital income at ￿ at rates and
rebates the proceeds to agents as a lump-sum transfer. For given tax rates, equilibrium in this
economy leads to indirect utilities for agents which are quadratic in the two tax rates. The pro￿les
4See their equation (5), which describes what they term the political aggregation of individual preferences.
The authors are not explicit about the assumptions underlying this equation, but it seems that the random, non-
policy elements in agents￿preferences must enter additively and be uniformly distributed. Other distributional
assumptions￿ including one of the ones I consider below￿ also have the implication that voting outcomes maximize
a utilitarian social welfare function. See below, section 4.3, footnote 15.
8of preferences over tax rates that thus emerge describe a type of two-dimensional spatial model,
where each agent type has an ideal tax policy, and an agent￿ s utility falls as the implemented policy
is further from his or her ideal. Assuming that the two variables that describe each agent￿ s ideal
tax rates are bivariately log-normal, DeDonder simulates the model and calculates the average
size of the model￿ s uncovered set￿ as well as other majority-voting solution sets￿ across many
simulations. DeDonder ￿nds that his solution sets are small relative to the entire issue space,
and thus concludes that they yield sharp predictions for the outcomes of the redistributive voting
game he considers. My approach here di⁄ers from DeDonder￿ s in that the model I consider is a
fully-articulated dynamic general equilibrium growth model, which I attempt to calibrate in a way
that is at least plausible. My focus, too, is less on the size of sets like the uncovered set relative
to the entire issue space, but rather relative to the variation we see in the cross-country data.
Like DeDonder, I ￿nd that the uncovered set is a small fraction of the entire issue space￿ here,
about 7%￿ but its shape is still such that it rules out very little in terms of the range of policies
summarized in Table 1.
2 The model economy
The economy is populated by a large number of in￿nitely-lived households, with the size of the
population normalized to one. Time is discrete and there is no uncertainty. Households are
distinguished by their initial endowments of capital and the productivity of the hours of labor
they supply. The economy￿ s production sector consists of technologies for producing consumption
and new capital. The government levies ￿ at rate taxes on households￿income from labor and
capital and on consumption, and redistributes the proceeds￿ net of revenue needed to ￿nance
exogenous government consumption￿ as a lump-sum transfer.
Characterizing the decision problem facing households is easier if we have in hand some of the
equilibrium price relationships implied by zero-pro￿t conditions in the production sector. Thus,
I will describe the production side of the economy before turning to household behavior. The
government￿ s behavior, which is rather simple, is described last.
2.1 Production sector
The production side of the economy is a two-sector AK structure in the spirit of Rebelo [23].
One sector produces a consumption good (Z) using a Cobb-Douglas technology with capital and
e⁄ective labor as inputs. The other sector produces new capital (X) using an AK technology with







Xt = A(1 ￿ ￿t)Kt: (2)
9Here, ￿t denotes the fraction of the aggregate capital stock, Kt, devoted to the production of the
consumption good, Zt, and 1 ￿ ￿t the fraction of the capital stock devoted to the production of
new capital. Output of the consumption good, Zt, will ultimately be divided between private
consumption Ct and government consumption Gt. The determination of Gt, which is exogenous
and does not enter households￿utility functions, will be described in more detail below. Nt is the
aggregate quantity of e⁄ective labor employed; the distinction between hours worked and e⁄ective
labor will become clearer when we consider the problem facing households in the economy. A is a
scale parameter that determines the productivity of investment in new capital.
Under constant returns to scale, the number of ￿rms is indeterminate, so assume for simplicity
that a single price-taking ￿rm operates the production sector. The ￿rm rents capital and e⁄ective
labor from households at prices rt and wt, and chooses Nt, Kt and ￿t to solve
maxZt + qtXt ￿ wtNt ￿ rtKt
subject to the production technologies given in (1) and (2). Here, qt is the price of new capital in
units of the consumption good. With constant returns to scale, the ￿rm must earn zero pro￿t in
equilibrium.

















The last two conditions, taken together, require that rt and qt be such that




if pro￿ts are to be zero in equilibrium. We will exploit this feature of equilibrium below.
Note that national income, which I will denote by Yt, obeys
Yt =wtNt + rtKt (4)
= (1 ￿ ￿)Zt + (￿=￿t)Zt
=
￿





10Note also that when Nt and ￿t are constant (as will be the case in the balanced growth equilibria
























￿ from (3) and (5).
2.2 Households
The model features a continuum of households and a ￿nite number of household types. Each
period, households rent labor and capital to the economy￿ s production sector, using the resulting
income (net of taxes and transfers) to purchase consumption and new units of capital. A household
that chooses to work nt hours in period t supplies ent units of e⁄ective labor, where e is a
productivity parameter that di⁄ers across groups of households, but is constant over time. Initial
endowments of capital also vary across groups of households. I normalize the economy￿ s initial
aggregate stock of capital K0 to be one, and let the variable s denote households￿shares of the
initial stock, so a ￿ type-(e;s)￿household begins with an initial endowment of capital equal to s.
Note that in a balanced growth equilibrium with constant tax rates, the capital stock of a type-
(e;s) household always obeys kt=Kt = s￿ i.e., the relative distribution of capital is unchanging
over time.
The population size is normalized to unity. Let p(e;s) denotes the mass of households of type
(e;s); then,
P
(e;s)2T p(e;s) = 1 where T is the (￿nite) set of household types.
Each household pays three types of taxes￿ capital and labor income taxes and a consumption
tax￿ and receives a lump-sum transfer payment. A typical household faces a sequence of budget
constraints of the form
(1 ￿ ￿k)rtkt + (1 ￿ ￿n)wtent + Tt = (1 + ￿c)ct + qtxt (6)
where ￿k and ￿n are the income tax rates, ￿c is the consumption tax rate, and Tt is the transfer
payment; wt and rt are the wage and rental rates, respectively; and qt is the price of new capital
in units of consumption. I￿ ve omitted time subscripts on the tax rates, since these will be constant
under the political equilibria I consider￿ I assume full commitment to constant tax rates from
date zero on. Capital depreciates at rate ￿, so a household￿ s holding of capital evolves according
to
kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)kt + xt. (7)
11The household￿ s preferences feature a constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution. I ￿nd
it convenient to work with a transformation of preferences that is degree-one homogeneous in















where " > 0 is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, and the parameter   governs the
trade-o⁄ between consumption and leisure (one minus hours worked).
A typical household￿ s decision problem can be thought of in terms of its intratemporal and
intertemporal aspects. In any period, given prices, the transfer payment, the household￿ s capital
at the start of the period and its planned purchase of capital for next period, the intratemporal





(1 ￿ ￿k)rtkt + (1 ￿ ￿n)wte + Tt ￿ qt [kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)kt] = (1 + ￿c)c + (1 ￿ ￿n)wtel (10)
and
1 ￿ l ￿ 0.
Note that the intratemporal choice problem is restricted to those values kt, kt+1, etc., such that
(1 ￿ ￿k)rtkt + (1 ￿ ￿n)wte + Tt ￿ qt [kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)kt] > 0.
In a representative agent economy￿ given the Inada conditions present in both preferences
and technology￿ the inequality constraints 0 ￿ l ￿ 1 would not be binding in equilibrium. With
heterogeneous households, however￿ and given that the households receive a lump-sum transfer
and own capital￿ we must allow for the possibility that some households will choose to supply zero
hours of work to the production sector￿ i.e., that the l ￿ 1 constraint might bind. For example,
households with relatively low values of the productivity parameter e and high values of s may
choose not to supply labor in some equilibria.
It￿ s straightforward to show that when the l ￿ 1 constraint does not bind, the household
￿ spends￿constant shares of its full income (the left-hand side of (10)) on consumption and leisure.
Letting ct and lt denote the solutions to the problem at t, we have
(1 + ￿c)ct =
1
1 +  
f(1 ￿ ￿k)rtkt + (1 ￿ ￿n)wte + Tt ￿ qt [kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)kt]g (11)
12and
(1 ￿ ￿n)wtelt =
 
1 +  
f(1 ￿ ￿k)rtkt + (1 ￿ ￿n)wte + Tt ￿ qt [kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)kt]g. (12)
The second of these, together with nt = 1￿lt, gives the household￿ s supply of e⁄ective labor e⁄ort
when the l ￿ 1 constraint is slack:
ent =
1
1 +  
e ￿
 
1 +  
(1 ￿ ￿k)rtkt + Tt ￿ qt [kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)kt]
(1 ￿ ￿n)wt
. (13)
When the l ￿ 1 constraint binds, the household has
lt = 1, (14)
(or ent = 0) and
(1 + ￿c)ct = (1 ￿ ￿k)rtkt + Tt ￿ qt [kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)kt]. (15)
The constraint will bind precisely when the right-hand side of (12) is non-positive. Note that while
the consumption tax rate ￿c has no direct impact on either the intensive or extensive margins
of household labor supply (in the intratemporal problem), it will exercise an indirect in￿ uence
through the transfer Tt. Other things the same, a higher value of Tt reduces the supply of e⁄ective
labor e⁄ort.
One can show￿ as we￿ ll see below￿ that in a balanced growth equilibrium, whether a household
supplies a positive amount of labor e⁄ort depends on its value of e and its capital holdings relative
to the aggregate capital stock, s = kt=Kt, both of which are constant in equilibrium (the former
by assumption, the latter as a feature of a balanced growth path). Consequently, a household that
supplies zero labor in a period always supplies zero labor, while a household that supplies a positive
amount of labor always supplies a positive amount of labor. Thus, to characterize the solution
to the household￿ s intertemporal problem, it￿ s enough to consider Euler equations assuming the
household is either always constrained or always unconstrained.
In either case￿ unconstrained or constrained￿ the household￿ s Euler equations take the form
(ct)
￿1=" (lt)
 (1￿1=") = ￿ (ct+1)
￿1=" (lt+1)
 (1￿1=") (1 ￿ ￿k)rt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)qt+1
qt
.
Anticipating the arguments of section 2.4, suppose that qt+1=qt is constant and equal to 1 + gq.
Using rt = qtA, the return to investment in physical capital on the right-hand side of the Euler
equation is constant and given by
(1 ￿ ￿k)rt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)qt+1
qt
= (1 + gq)[(1 ￿ ￿k)A + 1 ￿ ￿].
13If leisure is constant￿ as will be the case under balanced growth￿ the growth rate of household
consumption obeys
1 + gc = (￿ (1 + gq)((1 ￿ ￿k)A + 1 ￿ ￿))
" . (16)
If the transfer payment Tt and the real wage wt also grow at the constant rate 1 + gc, it￿ s clear
that a path for household capital that grows at a constant rate and, in particular, is such that
qtkt also grows at rate 1 + gc, will satisfy the household￿ s Euler equations.
In standard fashion, restrictions on the models parameters, and restrictions on admissible
values of ￿k￿ restrictions guaranteeing that ￿ (1 + gc)
1￿(1=") < 1￿ will guarantee that the paths
just described satisfy households￿transversality conditions as well. A more detailed discussion
of the solution to the household￿ s problem, and the construction of a balanced growth path, is
contained in the appendix.
2.3 Government
The government in this model simply levies taxes and redistributes the revenue￿ in excess of an
amount needed to ￿nance government consumption￿ as a lump-sum transfer to households. Tax
rates and the transfer are non-targeted￿ that is, they are identical across households. I assume
that the government runs a balanced budget in each period. The government￿ s budget constraint
is:
￿krtKt + ￿nwtNt + ￿cCt = Tt + Gt;
where Gt is exogenously speci￿ed government consumption. Recall that we have a measure one
of households. Therefore, aggregate and average quantities coincide, so that Tt is both aggregate
transfer spending and the per-household transfer payment.
To keep consistency with balanced growth under alternative tax policies, government con-
sumption Gt is assumed to be speci￿ed as a constant fraction of the economy￿ s output of the
consumption good Zt:
Gt = ￿Zt.
Redistributive policy is then determined by choices of the tax rates ￿k, ￿n and ￿c, with Tt residually
determined from the budget constraint. In the numerical simulations of the model that I perform
below, I impose the restriction that Tt ￿ 0￿ i.e., I do not allow lump-sum ￿nancing of Gt. I impose
this constraint for the sake of realism: we almost never see governments ￿nance their consumption
through lump-sum taxes. At the same time, it￿ s di¢ cult to write down a model where lump-sum
taxes would not be chosen if they were available, so they are ruled out by assumption.
How the tax rates ￿k, ￿n and ￿c are set￿ which will determine the size of the transfer￿ will
be described in a subsequent section.
Remark 1 At this point, one may ask, Why this particular model? The model has a couple
14virtues. First, as discussed in the introduction, the distortionary e⁄ects of taxes, especially cap-
ital income taxes, are more severe here than in the standard neoclassical growth model. I would
conjecture that the further we move away from the case of pure redistribution of a ￿xed stock of
resources, majority-voting methods are more likely to be conclusive. Obviously, the simplicity of
the model is also appealing, in particular its lack of transitional dynamics. Also, because the econ-
omy will immediately be on a balanced growth path, the assumption of constant tax rates becomes
less restrictive, though not entirely innocuous. Since the relative standings of households in the
economy￿ s wealth and earnings distributions do not change, their preferences over constant tax
rates do not change. If the political decision is a set of tax rates for now and into the inde￿nite
future, revisiting that decision at a later date would lead to the same outcome.
Remark 2 Setting aside the particular problem at hand, is the AK framework a good model of
economic growth? The evidence on this is mixed. Models of this sort imply a link between rates
of investment and rates of growth, which Jones [8], for example, concludes are not present in the
data. McGrattan [16] o⁄ers a critique of Jones￿ s ￿ndings and concludes that the investment-growth
connection predicted by AK models is consistent with the data.
2.4 Balanced growth equilibria with constant tax rates
This section describes the economy￿ s balanced growth equilibrium for given values of the tax
parameters.
Given constant tax rates and an initial distribution of capital holdings, an equilibrium consists
of sequences of prices fwt;rt;qtg
1
t=0; production decisions fKt;Nt;￿tg
1
t=0; a set of household deci-
sions for each household type (e;s), denoted fct (e;s);nt (e;s);kt+1 (e;s)g
1
t=0; and a sequence of
transfer payments fTtg
1
t=0 such that: (a) the household decisions for each household type max-
imize that type￿ s lifetime utility; (b) the production decisions maximize pro￿ts (at zero) in the
production sector; (c) the government￿ s budget constraint is satis￿ed at each date; and (d) the
allocations are feasible￿ i.e., the following resource constraints are satis￿ed at every date:
X
(e;s)2T






p(e;s)[kt+1 (e;s) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)kt (e;s)] = Xt = A(1 ￿ ￿t)Kt
X
(e;s)2T
p(e;s)ent (e;s) = Nt
X
(e;s)2T
p(e;s)kt (e;s) = Kt.
Note that the resource constraints for gross investment and the capital stock imply that aggregate
15capital grows according to
Kt+1
Kt
= A(1 ￿ ￿t) + 1 ￿ ￿.
A balanced growth equilibrium is an equilibrium in which (a) consumption, capital stocks,
prices and transfer payments grow at constant rates, and (b) ￿t and the nt (e;s)￿ s are constant.
The construction of balanced growth equilibria is described in detail in the appendix; in this
section I simply characterize such equilibria.
As described in section 2.1, equation (5), the structure of the production sector dictates that in a
balanced growth equilibrium output of the consumption good￿ hence also household consumption
and the transfer payment￿ will grow at a rate gZ, while capital stocks will grow at a rate gK, with
1 + gZ = (1 + gK)
￿ : (17)
To be consistent with households￿budget constraints (or e¢ ciency conditions in the production
sector), wt must share the same growth rate as consumption, while qt and rt share a common
growth rate gq satisfying (1 + gq)(1 + gK) = 1 + gZ. With 1 + gZ = (1 + gK)
￿, we have
1 + gq =
1 + gZ
1 + gK
= (1 + gK)
￿￿1 . (18)
The keys to calculating a balanced growth equilibrium are the determination of ￿ (which pins
down gK) and the household labor supply decisions n(e;s) (which pin down N and, together with
￿, everything else).
To see the determination of ￿, consider the Euler equations for a typical household, assuming
that lt is constant, that qt+1=qt = 1 + gq, and using rt+1 = qt+1A:
ct+1
ct
= (￿ (1 + gq)[(1 ￿ ￿k)A + 1 ￿ ￿])
" .
In a balanced growth equilibrium, aggregate private consumption￿ s share of Zt is constant, as are
households￿shares of aggregate private consumption, so the left-hand side of the last expression
equals 1 + gZ: Using (17) and (18), we can replace 1 + gZ and 1 + gq with 1 + gK and rearrange
to get:
1 + gK = (￿ [(1 ￿ ￿k)A + 1 ￿ ￿])
"
￿+"(1￿￿) .
Since 1 + gK = A(1 ￿ ￿) + 1 ￿ ￿, this determines ￿￿ as
￿￿ = 1 ￿
(￿ [(1 ￿ ￿k)A + 1 ￿ ￿])
"
￿+"(1￿￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
A
. (19)
Note that the capital growth rate depends only on the capital income tax rate ￿k, and not on
16the labor income or consumption tax rates. Note too that the determination of ￿￿ doesn￿ t rely on
a particular choice of aggregate e⁄ective labor e⁄ort, N, only the assumption that N is constant.
Thus, we can determine the equilibrium value of N taking ￿￿ as given.
The determination of household (and aggregate) labor supply is complicated by the fact that
some households may choose to supply zero hours in some equilibria.5 In the appendix, I show
that in a balanced growth equilibrium, the supply of e⁄ective labor by an unconstrained household
of type (e;s) will be:
1
1 +  
e ￿
 
1 +  
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿k
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿n)
￿
￿￿s +
￿k￿=￿￿ + ￿n (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿c (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿
(1 ￿ ￿n)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
N, (20)
More generally, for any household type (e;s), e⁄ective labor supply in a balanced growth equilib-
rium is given by the maximum of the last expression and zero.
Let ￿(e;s;N;￿) denote the last expression (20), where ￿ denotes the vector of tax rates
￿ = (￿c;￿n;￿k). Note that if ￿(e;s;N;￿) > 0 then so is ￿(e0;s0;N;￿) if either e0 ￿ e or s0 ￿ s;
that is, if household type (e;s) works in equilibrium, so will any household which has either higher
labor productivity or a smaller endowment of capital. Equilibrium aggregate e⁄ective labor￿





Given N￿ and ￿￿￿ and the economy￿ s initial capital stock K0 = 1￿ the paths of all aggregate
quantities and prices are determined. Capital at any date is K￿
t = [A(1 ￿ ￿￿) + 1 ￿ ￿]
t K0 and out-
put of the consumption good is Z￿
t = B (￿￿K￿
t )
￿ (N￿)
1￿a. Equilibrium prices are given by plugging
the equilibrium aggregates into the appropriate expressions from section 2.1. Each household￿ s
stock of capital grows at the same rate as the aggregate stock, while the household￿ s consumption
and leisure choices follow from their decision rules￿ (11), (12), (14) and (15)￿ taking into account
equilibrium prices, transfers and the path of household capital￿ i.e., that kt+1 = (1 + gK)kt.
3 Calibration
While the model is a simple one in many respects￿ in particular, the AK structure frees us
from dealing with transitional dynamics￿ it is nonetheless su¢ ciently complicated that solving
the model can only be done computationally. To do so, we need to specify values for the model￿ s
parameters.
I calibrate the model, roughly, to U.S. data. One could conceivably calibrate the model to
data from another country among, say, those listed in Table 1, or to an average of some set of
5The aggregate labor input, because the consumption-producing technology obeys an Inada condition, will
always be positive.
17Quantity Target
Private consumption share of output 65%
Government consumption (G) share of output 20%
Labor￿ s share of national income 60%
Fraction of time endowment spent working 30%
Consumption growth rate 2% per year
Table 2: Targets for calibration of parameters
countries. I choose the U.S. mainly because of the familiarity of the basic parameters, though I
don￿ t think the main conclusion of the paper￿ the qualitative conclusion, that majority voting
imposes little discipline on the range of tax policies possible in politico-economic equilibrium￿ is
sensitive to this decision. The numerical values of the tax policies obtained under probabilistic
voting, or contained in the model￿ s uncovered set, would di⁄er for a di⁄erent calibration, but the
general inconclusiveness of the results will still obtain. Put di⁄erently, it￿ s su¢ cient for my point,
I think, that an economy calibrated to be in some respects ￿ like the U.S.￿cannot decide whether it
wants taxes that look like those of the U.S. or those of Norway. In any case, one should interpret
the results as applying to a model economy calibrated to match certain stylized facts about the
U.S. economy.
I calibrate the economy as if it were in a balanced growth equilibrium with taxes given by the
U.S. data in Table 1: ￿ ￿ = (￿ ￿c;￿ ￿n;￿ ￿k) = (:064;:234;:273). I specify certain parameters without
reference to the model￿ s equilibrium behavior￿ in particular, I set ", the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution, to be 0:5, and ￿, the capital depreciation rate, to be 10% per year. The value for "
is within the range of most estimates, while the value for ￿ is a standard one used in calibrated
growth models. The model￿ s remaining taste and technology parameters￿ ￿, A,  , ￿ and ￿￿ are
then calibrated to yield a balanced growth equilibrium that has the properties summarized in
Table 2.
Calibration here is somewhat more complicated than in the more-familiar one-sector neoclas-
sical growth model. In the neoclassical growth model, for example, 1 ￿ ￿ would represent labor￿ s
share of national income. In the present model, labor￿ s share of national income and consumption￿ s
share of output are intertwined, and both are related to the equilibrium value of ￿, the fraction of
capital devoted to producing the consumption good. The steps in calibrating the model￿ which I
describe in detail in the appendix￿ are roughly as follows. The target values for the output shares
of private and government consumption pin down ￿, which is government￿ s share of output of the
consumption good. The target consumption shares plus the labor income share pin down a value
of the parameter ￿ and a balanced growth equilibrium value of ￿; call it ￿ ￿. That ￿ ￿, together with
￿ and ￿, imply a unique value of A that will meet the growth rate target in the last line of Table
2. The choice of ￿ is then such that, taken in conjunction with the other parameters and with ￿ ￿k,
18￿ ￿ is in fact chosen￿ i.e., the typical household￿ s Euler equation is satis￿ed when the household￿ s
capital stock grows at rate A(1 ￿ ￿ ￿) + 1 ￿ ￿. Finally,   is chosen so that, given ￿, ￿, ￿ ￿c and ￿ ￿n,
the average household chooses to use 30% of its time endowment working.6
The other key parameters for which values need to be assigned are those describing the dis-
tribution of household types￿ that is, the possible values taken on by (e;s) and their distrib-
ution p(e;s).7 To keep the state space manageable, I assume that e and s each take on only
two values, low or high. Taking account of combinations, this results in four household types￿







I assume the marginal distributions are such that








The advantage of this latter assumption is that allows for a simple characterization of the corre-
lation between e and s. Let p1 (e;s) be de￿ned as
p1 (e;s) =
 























p1 (e;s) would be the form of p(e;s) assuming e and s were perfectly correlated, while p0 (e;s)
would be the form if e and s were uncorrelated. For any correlation in between, call it ￿, the
implied p(e;s) is given by8
p(e;s) = ￿p1 (e;s) + (1 ￿ ￿)p0 (e;s).
6In fact, for this calculation I use the ￿rst-order conditions from the intratemporal problem that would obtain
if there were a single representative household￿ equivalently, a household with consumption and work e⁄ort equal
to aggregate consumption and work e⁄ort￿ since hours worked for such a household can be derived analytically.
Because of convexity e⁄ects, average time spent working by households in the economy in a balanced growth
equilibrium given taxes ￿ ￿ will di⁄er slightly from 30%. Matching the average of household hours￿ rather than
hours of an average household￿ would, however, entail solving a complicated ￿xed point problem in  .
7Given the simpli￿ed approach to calibrating   described above, these distributional parameters played no role
in the calibration of the parameters of tastes or technology.
8This uses the fact that both e and s have mean 1.
19In the numerical experiments I perform, I set ￿ = :46, which is the correlation between wealth
and earnings in U.S. data reported by Budria Rodriguez, Diaz-Gimenez, Quadrini and Rios-Rull







Note that the most numerous type￿ the (eL;sL) households￿ amounts to just less than half the
population, so no one household type will be decisive for the economy￿ s political decisions.
The values of eL, eH, sL and sH are set in the following way. For the values of s, I use data
on the quintiles of the U.S. distribution of wealth calculated in Budria Rodriguez et al [3]. In
particular, I assume that the bottom 60% of the wealth distribution own 7% of the aggregate
capital stock (sL = :07=:60), while the top 40% own 93% (sH = :93=:40). For the values of e, I
choose eL and eH to give a standard deviation of log wages across households equal to 0:55, which
is about in the middle of the numbers reported by Katz and Autor [11] for various years from 1963
to 1995.9 This procedure implies feL;eHg = f0:5467;1:6800g. Note that wealth in this economy
is distributed much more unequally than earning ability; sH=sL ￿ = 20, while eH=eL ￿ = 3.
4 Political equilibria
4.1 Household preferences over policies
Any balanced growth equilibrium with constant tax rates gives rise to household preferences over
the tax rates in the form of households￿lifetime utilities from equilibrium consumption and leisure
choices. Given the form of households￿utility functions, if household consumption grows at the










which is equally valid for " 6= 1 or (in the limit) " = 1.
For this expression to make sense, we need 1 > ￿ (1 + gZ)
1￿ 1
", the equivalent here of the house-
hold￿ s transversality condition. Recalling that 1+gZ = (1 + gK)
￿ = (￿ [(1 ￿ ￿k)A + 1 ￿ ￿])
￿"
￿+"(1￿￿),
this requirement places restrictions on admissible values of the model parameters. The appendix
discusses these restrictions in more detail.
Assuming 1 > ￿ (1 + gZ)
1￿ 1
" is satis￿ed, lifetime utility in a balanced growth equilibrium is
given by (21), with [A(1 ￿ ￿￿) + 1 ￿ ￿]
￿ for 1 + gZ, and c0 and l0 given by the date-zero versions
of either (11) and (12), or (14) and (15), with all prices set equal to their equilibrium values, k1
9In Katz and Autor￿ s data the standard deviation of log wages for all men and women rises from about 0.5 in
1963 to about 0.6 in 1995. See their Table 1.
20set equal to [A(1 ￿ ￿￿) + 1 ￿ ￿]s, and ￿￿ as given in (19). The precise forms taken by c0 and l0
in equilibrium are given in the appendix.
For a household of type (e;s), we let V (￿;e;s) denote the lifetime utility function described
above, with ￿ representing a particular vector of tax rates (￿c;￿n;￿k).
4.2 General assumptions on political equilibria
Policy choices in the model are at date zero, through some form of majority voting. Under
probabilistic voting, we imagine two-party competition in which candidates espouse tax platforms
￿, and households vote for one of the two candidates. The Pareto set and the uncovered set
are relevant to two-party competition as well, as no candidate in such an election would want
to espouse a platform outside of the Pareto set or the uncovered set.10 The uncovered set is
also relevant to voting protocols where there is an agenda setter that faces households with an
exhaustive sequence of pairwise contests to decide among a ￿nite set of alternatives￿ say, an
agenda for choosing amongst the alternatives in Table 1. In that case, it has been shown by Miller
[20] that the set of sophisticated voting outcomes￿ roughly, the possible outcomes when voters
take into account each other￿ s optimal decisions and anticipate the e⁄ect that each round of voting
has on the ￿nal outcome￿ lies in the uncovered set.
In any case, the decision taken at date zero is ￿ once and for all￿ : the government commits to a
constant path of tax rates. As discussed in Remark 1, this assumption, admittedly simplistic, is
perhaps less stringent than meets the eye, when one considers the linear structure of the model￿
because household￿ s relative wealth and earnings are constant over time, if voting were repeated
at some future date (with alternatives again being tax rates for now and the inde￿nite future) the
policy choice would be the same (assuming the political process identi￿ed a unique policy choice).
Exploring richer speci￿cations, without commitment, is a topic for future research. Given the
inconclusiveness that we obtain under the simplifying assumption of full commitment, however, it
is unclear whether relaxing the assumption would prove a fruitful line of inquiry.
4.3 Probabilistic voting
Probabilistic voting has a long history as an alternative to deterministic voting models of the
Downsian, median voter variety. Models where the issue space is multi-dimensional seem partic-
ularly well-suited to the probabilistic voting framework. The restrictions on preferences su¢ cient
to yield the existence of a ￿ median voter￿when the issue space is multi-dimensional are generally
quite severe.11 As Ordeshook [21] writes, ￿Equilibrium is assured in deterministic models only if
10That no candidate would espouse a platform outside of the Pareto set is obvious, as such a platform could be
unanimously defeated. The undesirability of platforms outside the uncovered set is discussed below in section 4.4.
11For example, in spatial voting models￿ where voters have ideal points in the issue space and a voter￿ s utility
declines with distance from the voter￿ s ideal point￿ su¢ cient conditions have been given by Plott [22], Davis,
DeGroot and Hinich [6], and others. Such sets of conditions typically require very special distributions of voters￿
ideal points, such that any line through the candidate majority-rule equilibrium divides the set of ideal points in
21we impose severe restrictions on the electorate￿ s preference distribution, whereas the equilibrium
just described [an example of probabilistic voting] can be shown to exist for far weaker assumptions
about this distribution.￿An early application of probabilistic voting to the problem of redistri-
bution is Lindbeck and Weibull [14]. Coughlin [5] is a standard theoretical reference. Yang [24]
applies a logistic probabilistic voting framework, similar to that elaborated below, to the issue of
tari⁄ formation. Hassler, Krusell, Storesletten and Zilibotti [10] use a di⁄erent, though related,
form of probabilistic voting as the political equilibrium concept in their analysis of the dynamics
of welfare states.
Suppose that two candidates, a and b, espouse policies ￿a and ￿b. Under deterministic voting,
household (e;s) would vote for a over b if and only if
V (￿a;e;s) > V (￿b;e;s).
Probabilistic voting, in its simplest form, adds a random element (from the candidates￿point of
view) to voters￿preferences, which may represent non-policy considerations about the candidates
that in￿ uence the utility voters get from having a particular candidate win o¢ ce and implement
his or her espoused platform. Suppose the random elements are additive, in particular that the
utility household (e;s) gets from a victory by candidate a is given by
V (￿a;e;s) + ￿a.
Then, (e;s) would vote for a over b if and only if
V (￿a;e;s) + ￿a > V (￿b;e;s) + ￿b.
The ￿a and ￿b here are assumed random from the candidates￿points of view; households know
their own preferences. Candidates are assumed to know the distribution of ￿ ￿ ￿a ￿ ￿b.12 Each
candidate then knows that if a espouses ￿a while b espouses ￿b, the probability that household
(e;s) will vote for a over b is
Prf(e;s) votes for a over bg= Prf￿ > V (￿b;e;s) ￿ V (￿a;e;s)g
= 1 ￿ F [V (￿b;e;s) ￿ V (￿a;e;s)],
where F denotes the CDF of ￿.
Let ￿a (￿a;￿b;e;s) denote the probability that (e;s) votes for a when the candidates￿platforms
half.
12The distribution of ￿ can be assumed to depend on (e;s); more precisely, there may be a di⁄erent distribution of
￿ for each household type. In what follows, though, I assume a logistic distribution for ￿, common across household
types.




exp[V (￿a;e;s)] + exp[V (￿b;e;s)]
.
If, in contrast, the random non-policy elements enter household preferences multiplicatively, in
the sense that
(e;s)￿ s utility from a victory by a = exp(￿a)V (￿a;e;s),
then the probability that (e;s) votes for a is given by
￿a (￿a;￿b;e;s) =
V (￿a;e;s)
V (￿a;e;s) + V (￿b;e;s)
.
Remark 3 As in Yang [24], I think of the random, non-policy elements in households￿preferences
as being normally distributed, and view the logistic distribution as a highly tractable approximation
to normality. This choice is somewhat arbitrary. Note, too, that there is nothing in households￿
observable economic choices that would allow us to discriminate between a logistic or some other
distribution or, for that matter, between multiplicative or additive disturbances. From the stand-
point of households￿economic decisions, di⁄erent assumptions about the ￿￿ s and their distribution
simply amount to di⁄erent monotone transformations of households￿preferences.
The strategy set of each candidate is the set of ￿ vectors that are compatible with the existence
of a balanced growth equilibrium with a nonnegative transfer payment.13 I also restrict the
choices of ￿ to lie in [0;:9] ￿ [0;:9] ￿ [0;1:4]: Setting either ￿k or ￿n equal to one is problematic
computationally, and while no natural upper bound exists for ￿c, in practice the ￿c ￿ 1:4 constraint
does not bind for the probabilistic voting equilibria that I calculate.14
The candidates￿pay-o⁄ functions are assumed to be their expected pluralities (margins of









exp[V (￿a;e;s)] + exp[V (￿b;e;s)]
￿
;
candidate a￿ s expected plurality is then
X
(e;s)2T










13A negative transfer payment would amount to lump-sum ￿nancing of G, which I rule out by assumption.
14And, ￿c = 1:4 is just above the largest consumption tax rate preferred by the four household types in the
calculations reported below.
23An analogous expression, with V ( ￿ ) replacing exp(V ( ￿ )), holds for the case of multiplicative
disturbances. Symmetric expressions describe the expected plurality for candidate b. The two
pay-o⁄ functions (and strategy sets) describe a two-person, zero-sum, normal-form game. I focus
on symmetric pure-strategy equilibria of this game￿ a chooses some ￿￿
a, b chooses some ￿￿
b, the
choices are best responses to one another, and ￿￿
a = ￿￿
b ￿ ￿￿.
Remark 4 Note that if utilities are di⁄erentiable in ￿, the ￿rst-order conditions for an interior
maximum of (22) with respect to ￿a, given ￿b, evaluated at a symmetric equilibrium, take the form
X
(e;s)2T
p(e;s)D￿V (￿￿;e;s) = 0
which are identical to the ￿rst-order conditions for maximizing a utilitarian social welfare function.
If the ￿rst-order conditions have a unique solution￿ as would be the case under strict concavity, for
example￿ then interior symmetric voting equilibria coincide with utilitarian social welfare maxima.
This is also true in our case, even though the problem is posed on a discrete grid of tax vectors and
corners do come into play￿ that is, the equilibrium ￿￿
Additive described below is also the maximum of
P
(e;s)2T p(e;s)V (￿;e;s). One can likewise show, for the case of multiplicative disturbances, that




Given the complicated nature of the lifetime utility functions V (￿;e;s), it would be surprising
if one could give general conditions guaranteeing the existence of a symmetric equilibrium in
this game, and I have not attempted to do so. Rather, I solve for a symmetric equilibrium
of the game computationally, using the calibrated version of the model described in section 3.
For computational purposes, one must treat ￿ as taking on a ￿nite set of values. I therefore
approximate [0;:9]￿[0;:9]￿[0;1:4] by having each of the two income taxes take on values only in
the set f0;:01;:02;:::;:90g, while ￿c lies on the similarly spaced grid f0;:01;:02;:::;1:4g.
The results of that exercise reveal the outcomes under probabilistic voting to be quite fragile
with respect to the choice of additive or multiplicative disturbances. Under additive disturbances,
15Note that if the disturbances are additive but the distribution of ￿ is uniform on some interval [￿l;￿u], then the
probability that (e;s) votes for a, 1 ￿ F [V (￿b;e;s) ￿ V (￿a;e;s)], is an increasing a¢ ne function of V (￿a;e;s) ￿
V (￿b;e;s), so that a￿ s expected plurality is an a¢ ne function of
P
p(e;s)V (￿a;e;s). In this case￿ which is similar
to the form of probabilistic voting used in Hassler, Krusell, Storesletten and Zilibotti [10]￿ each candidate would
choose the tax vector that maximizes utilitarian social welfare, regardless of the strategy employed by the candidate￿ s
opponent. If the disturbances are multiplicative, a candidate would seek to maximize
P
p(e;s)ln[V (￿a;e;s)],
analogous to the case of multiplicative disturbances under the logistic distribution which I use here.












￿ that is, a zero consumption tax; a labor income tax rate that is about average for the countries
in Table 1; and a capital income tax that is rather light compared to what we see in the data.












This equilibrium features a heavy reliance on the taxation of consumption; a capital income tax
that is close to the average in Table 1; and no taxation of labor income..
Supposing that one were interested simply in the ￿ size of government￿ ￿ that is, in the model￿ s
predictions for transfers as a percent of GDP￿ one might still wonder whether, in spite of the
near-orthogonality of equilibrium tax policies, the equilibrium transfer rates were similar across
the speci￿cations of probabilistic voting. Unfortunately, this is not the case. ￿￿
Additive corresponds,
essentially, to zero redistribution, with Tt approximately 0:008% of Yt. That is, under additive
disturbances, the probabilistic voting outcome simply ￿nances exogenous government consump-
tion, with virtually no redistribution. ￿￿
Multiplicative, on the other hand, results in transfers equal
to about 63% of GDP.
What￿ s driving the di⁄erence between the outcomes under additive and multiplicative distur-
bances? It was noted in Remark 4 that for a model with di⁄erentiable, strictly concave household
utilities, and assuming interior solutions, symmetric voting equilibria under additive and multi-












respectively. While the model here is solved on a discrete grid￿ and corner solutions do ￿gure
in the equilibria￿ this correspondence between symmetric probabilistic voting equilibria and the
solutions to optimization problems turns out to still apply: ￿￿
Additive does in fact solve (23) while
￿￿
Multiplicative solves (24). The latter problem tends to put more weight, compared to the former,
25on the utilities of the poorer household types, and thus tends to move the solution closer to
the preferred tax vectors of the poorer households. To see the intuition for this, note that under
di⁄erentiability, ￿￿
Multiplicative solves a problem analogous in form to the problem solved by ￿￿
Additive,
but with di⁄erent weights on the various household types, since ￿￿


















Given the greater disparity in household capital-holdings, compared to di⁄erences in labor pro-
ductivity, the poorer households in the model economy￿ those that achieve lower levels of lifetime
utility￿ are the two capital-poor household types. While ￿￿
Multiplicative redistributes resources to-
wards those household types, it does not completely erase the inequality in utility attainment, so
that ^ p(e;s) puts greater weight on the capital-poor household types as compared to p(e;s). For
the calibrated model used in the preceding calculations,
^ p(e;s) =
 
^ p(eL;sL) ^ p(eL;sH)














As one might expect, given the di⁄erence between ^ p(e;s) and p(e;s), ￿￿
Multiplicative is closer to
the preferred tax vectors of the two capital-poor household types than is ￿￿
Additive￿ on the grid
of tax vectors used in this section, the households of type (eH;sH) and (eL;sH) both prefer
￿ = (0;0:50;0); households of type (eH;sL) prefer ￿ = (0:09;0;0:43); and households of type
(eL;sL) prefer ￿ = (1:39;0:09;0:42).16
For household preferences over consumption and leisure, the di⁄erence between additive or mul-
tiplicative disturbances amounts merely to a monotone transformation of lifetime utility. While
innocuous from an economic standpoint, this transformation has a large impact on voting out-
comes. Given that we know relatively little about the precise way that households￿￿ non-policy￿
preferences should enter into their lifetime utility functions, this fragility is problematic.
16These are the tax vectors which solve maxV (￿;ei;sj). Note that the wealthiest household type, (eH;sH),
prefers positive taxes only because of the need to ￿nance Gt. If we allowed Tt < 0, the most preferred tax vector
of type (eH;sH) households would be ￿ = (0;0;0).
26The two equilibrium tax vectors above are nearly orthogonal. With an earlier version of
the model￿ one that di⁄ered most importantly by assuming no government consumption and no
correlation between wealth and productivity￿ the equilibrium outcomes were in fact orthogonal.
In one case, only consumption and capital income taxes were used, while in the other only labor
income taxes were used.
4.4 The Pareto set and the uncovered set
Given the two very di⁄erent outcomes under the two speci￿cations of probabilistic voting, it seemed
a natural next step to ask whether one or the other was a more sensible equilibrium, relative to
other solution concepts for majority-voting problems. If, for example, the model admitted a
Condorcet winner on a coarse grid of tax vectors, is that point better approximated by one of
the two probabilistic voting outcomes? If that were the case, then future experiments could be
conducted using whichever of the two probabilistic voting speci￿cations seemed to give the more
sensible outcomes.17 It seemed a worthwhile strategy, then, to coarsen the set of alternatives down
to a computationally manageable number, and use brute force methods to examine other solution
concepts￿ to look, for example, at the size and structure of the Pareto set and the uncovered set,
and, perhaps, to hunt for a Condorcet winner. This section summarizes the results of applying
that approach to our model economy.
In this section, then, I drop the pretense that the grid of tax vectors is approximating a
continuum, and suppose that the economy in fact faces a discrete set of choices. The Pareto set
is the set of alternatives that are not unanimously defeated by other alternatives￿ i.e., the set of




Since points outside the Pareto set can be unanimously defeated, we would expect candidates
under most any electoral rules to avoid them. Of course, in a purely redistributive setting, there￿ s
little information in the Pareto set￿ if voters are dividing a pie of ￿xed size, any allocation that
uses up the entire pie will be in the Pareto set. Taxes in our model, however, are not purely
redistributive￿ the consumption and labor income taxes distort household￿ s intratemporal choices,
and taxes on capital income can have severe adverse consequences for growth. There is at least
some hope, then, that the Pareto set might be small relative to the entire issue space, and would
thus restrict potential political outcomes in a meaningful way.
For calculating the Pareto set￿ and in fact for all the computations reported in this section￿ I
17Why not abandon probabilistic voting altogether at that point? A major advantage of probabilistic voting is
that the equilibria can be calculated fairly quickly on a ￿ne grid. The equilibria reported in the last section, for
example, were calculated in a matter of minutes. By contrast, calculating the Pareto set and uncovered set on a
much coarser grid￿ the results shown in Figures 1 and 2￿ took about 18 hours on a 1.8 GHz Pentium laptop.
27take the set of alternatives to lie on a fairly coarse grid, with each of the two income tax rates taking
on only 25 possible values, evenly spaced, between 0 and 0:90, while the consumption tax rate takes
on 38 possible values between 0 and 1:40, for a total of 23,750 alternatives. The computations
show that the e⁄ects of the taxes on the size of the economic ￿ pie￿are in fact important￿ the
Pareto set is only about 7% of the entire issue space. Nevertheless, its shape is such that our
real-world data from Table 1 are, for the most part, either in it, or quite close to it.
Figure 1 plots the Pareto set in three-dimensional space, together with the data points from
Table 1. Note that the data from Table 1 are simply super-imposed in the ￿gure to give a sense of
the variety of outcomes encompassed by the Pareto set; given the regularly-spaced grid of points
used in the computations, none of the tax vectors from Table 1 actually reside in the issue space.
Still, of the 20 tax schemes in the table, only 2￿ which are the high-capital-tax systems of Denmark
and Sweden￿ seem de￿nitely out of bounds.
Figure 1 suggests that, while ruling out Pareto ine¢ cient alternatives narrows considerably
the range of possible political outcomes, the alternatives that remain still vary widely, at least
relative to real-world outcomes. The uncovered set, a subset of the Pareto set, potentially restricts






￿ in words, alternative ￿i is majority-preferred to ￿j if and only if the measure of households
preferring ￿i to ￿j exceeds one half. Say that alternative ￿j covers ￿i if and only if ￿jP￿i and, if
￿hP￿j, then ￿hP￿i as well. The uncovered set is the set of alternatives ￿i for which there exist no
such ￿j covering them. When the majority preference relation is complete￿ so that ￿ (￿jP￿i) is
equivalent to ￿iP￿j￿ we have the following alternative de￿nition of covering: ￿j covers ￿i if and
only if ￿jP￿i and ￿iP￿h implies ￿jP￿h. That is, ￿j beats ￿i and beats any other alternative that
￿i beats. In that case, we can characterize the uncovered set as follows: ￿i is in the uncovered
set if and only ￿i beats all other alternatives, either directly or at once remove.18 As discussed in
Ordeshook [21], it￿ s reasonable to suppose that candidates in an election will not choose platforms
outside the uncovered set. To do so, when the majority preference relation is complete, would
be to choose a dominated strategy: if a candidate espouses platform ￿, which is covered by some
￿0, then switching to the covering platform ￿0 would guarantee the candidate payo⁄s at least as
large as ￿, and in some cases strictly larger, regardless of the strategy adopted by the candidate￿ s
opponent.19
Though less appropriate to the case of as many alternatives as shown in Figure 1￿ and more
18That is, for any ￿j either ￿iP￿j or there is a ￿h with ￿iP￿h and ￿hP￿j.
19This assumes candidates care only about winning, losing or tying, with the payo⁄ from winning strictly higher
than the payo⁄ from tying, which is strictly higher than the payo⁄ from losing.
28appropriate to the experiments below in section 4.5￿ Miller [20] shows that under an amendment
procedure, the set of sophisticated voting outcomes is a subset of the uncovered set.20 A recent
empirical application of the uncovered set is Bianco, Jeliazkov and Sened [2], who use data on the
policy preferences of U.S. House of Representatives members￿ along two dimensions, a civil rights
dimension and an economic dimension￿ to estimate the size and location of the uncovered set for
several Congressional sessions. They conclude that the uncovered set has substantial power for
predicting policy outcomes in the sessions of Congress they examine.
So, what does the model￿ s uncovered set look like? Unfortunately, it looks very much like
the Pareto set, as can be seen in Figure 2.21 While a small fraction of the entire issue space￿
approximately 7%￿ the uncovered set is nonetheless large relative to the variety of tax policies we
observe in the data.
The uncovered set is of a su¢ ciently small size that looking within it for a Condorcet winner￿
an alternative which wins all pairwise contests￿ is computationally quick. I ￿nd that no Condorcet
winner exists. Of the 1,727 elements in the uncovered set, the alternative which wins the most
pairwise contests is (￿c;￿n;￿k) = (0:6432;0;0:30), which defeats 1,446 other alternatives.
As with the results under probabilistic voting, one might wonder whether the transfer rates
associated with the uncovered set are more precisely described than the set of tax vectors itself.
As one might guess from Figure 2, the range of transfer rates associated with the tax vectors in
the uncovered set is quite large. The transfer rates run from essentially zero to around 100% of
GDP. Figure 3 plots a histogram that shows, in rough terms, the distribution of transfer rates
associated with the tax vectors in the uncovered set. While extremely large transfers￿ rate in
excess of, say, 50% of GDP￿ are relatively rare, there is still enormous variation in the transfer
rates associated with the tax vectors in the uncovered set.
What are we to make of these results? One interpretation is that, without imposing much more
structure on the political rules of the game, our model economy, calibrated roughly to stylized
facts about the U.S. economy, is as likely to adopt redistributive factor income and consumption
taxes that look like the U.S. system as it is to pick a set of taxes that looks much di⁄erent. While
the fact that taxes have e¢ ciency consequences holds out hope that majority voting methods may
allow a model economy to give sharp predictions about the sorts of redistributive tax schemes we
are apt to observe, the range of potential outcomes is still so wide as to be useless. In this light,
20An amendment procedure for voting amongst a ￿nite set of alternatives ￿xes an agenda￿ say ￿1;￿2;:::;￿M￿
then pits ￿M against ￿M￿1, the winner versus ￿M￿2, the winner of that contest versus ￿M￿3, ..., and the winner
of that contest versus ￿1. Voting is sophisticated when voters take account of each others￿optimal choices when
making their voting decision, and anticipate the e⁄ect that votes cast at earlier stages in the agenda will have on
the ￿nal outcome. Sophisticated voters may thus vote against their preferences at some stage in anticipation of the
consequences of that stage￿ s decision on later rounds of voting. See Banks [1] for a formal de￿nition.
21The calculations use the ￿rst de￿nition of covering presented above: ￿j covers ￿i if and only if ￿jP￿i and
if ￿hP￿j then ￿hP￿i. For the household preferences and grid of capital tax vectors used in these calculations,
however, the majority preference relation does turn out to be complete, so the various de￿nitions discussed above
are equivalent for this problem.
29the variety of real-world policies evidenced in Table 1 is, perhaps, not as puzzling as it at ￿rst
seems to be.
4.5 How many of the alternatives in Table 1 are uncovered?
To pursue this interpretation a bit further, suppose we take the data in Table 1 as the set of
alternatives available to our model economy. Which policies are plausible outcomes of majority-
rule processes in the context of our model? With the data in Table 1 as the issue space, we may
repeat the computations of the last section.
The Pareto set turns out to be the entire issue space￿ that is, none of the 20 tax schemes in
Table 1 can be ruled out purely on e¢ ciency grounds. Note in particular that restricting the set
of alternatives to those in Table 1 brings Sweden and Denmark back into the Pareto set, contra
the implication of Figure 1 and its larger set of alternatives.
What about the uncovered set? The uncovered set consists of the 10 alternatives listed in Table
3. The alternatives are ranked in descending order according to their dominance scores￿ that is,
the number of pairwise contests each alternative wins. The uncovered set is not reducible.22
1. ￿ Australia￿
2. ￿ Canada￿
3. ￿ United Kingdom￿
4. ￿ Switzerland￿
5. ￿ Netherlands￿





Table 3: The uncovered set when the issue space is given by the data in Table 1. Sorted in order
of descending dominance scores.
The matrix given by Table 4 is the dominance matrix for the 10 alternatives in the uncov-
ered set. If the ith-row, jth-column element is equal to 1, that means that alternative i beats
alternative j in a pairwise contest. A Condorcet winner, then, would correspond to a row i in
which all elements j 6= i were equal to one. No Condorcet winner exists here. The ￿ United
States￿alternative￿ row 6￿ beats ￿ Switzerland￿ , ￿ Netherlands￿ , ￿ Norway￿and ￿ Austria￿in pairwise
contests. The ￿ United States￿is beaten by ￿ Australia￿ , ￿ Canada￿ , ￿ United Kingdom￿ , ￿ Japan￿and
￿ Portugal￿ . Note that both ￿ Australia￿and ￿ United Kingdom￿are, in turn, beaten by both ￿ Norway￿
and ￿ Austria￿ .
22The de￿nition of reducibility is given in Banks [1], who also gives criteria for verifying reducibility using the
structure of the dominance matrix. If the uncovered set is reducible, it can be partitioned in such a way that all
sophisticated voting outcomes lie in a particular subset of the uncovered set.
301 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
2 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
3 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1
5 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
6 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
7 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
8 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
9 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
10 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 4: The dominance matrix for the alternatives in the uncovered set shown in Table 3.
The last point suggests that the majority preference relation is cyclic. In fact, one can construct
a Condorcet cycle encompassing all 10 alternatives, a feature we should expect given the results of
McKelvey [17] and the fact that there is no Condorcet winner.23 One such cycle is given in Table
5; there are perhaps others as well.
￿ Australia￿ defeats
￿ Canada￿ which defeats
￿ Switzerland￿ which defeats
￿ Japan￿ which defeats
￿ Netherlands￿ which defeats
￿ United Kingdom￿ which defeats
￿ Portugal￿ which defeats
￿ United States￿ which defeats
￿ Norway￿ which defeats
￿ Austria￿ which defeats
￿ Australia￿ .
Table 5: A Condorcet cycle involving all 10 alternatives in the uncovered set.
These calculations provide perhaps the starkest depiction of the inconclusiveness of majority-
voting politics applied to the problem of redistributive taxation in this model economy. We have
a simple growth model, calibrated to capture certain stylized features of long-run U.S. data,
populated by households which are heterogeneous in wealth and labor productivity. The model
captures the distortionary e⁄ects of taxation, and does so to a greater degree than the more
commonly employed neoclassical growth model. The number of household types in the economy
is small, though no type is large enough to be decisive. Inequality in the distributions of wealth
and earnings ability are calibrated roughly to data on U.S. wealth inequality and wage inequality.
23McKelvey [17] showed in a very general framework that if the majority preference relation is at all intransitive
then it will be completely intransitive, in the sense that virtually all alternatives can be put into a single cycle.
31The electorate in this section is faced with a simple choice among 20 alternative tax vectors, which
re￿ ect the wide variation in tax rates on consumption, labor income and capital income that we
see in OECD data. None of the 20 alternatives can be ruled out as Pareto-dominated and only 10
can be eliminated as covered. The 10 alternatives in the uncovered set encompass a wide variety
tax policies. No Condorcet winner exists, and the majority preference relation, on the uncovered
set, is completely cyclic.
5 Conclusions
This paper asks, in the context of a simple growth model with heterogeneous households, what,
if anything, the tools of majority voting can say about the redistributive taxation of capital
income, labor income and consumption. The model is a two-sector AK model, chosen in part
because it highlights the distortionary e⁄ects of factor income taxes. Intuitively, the greater
the distortionary e⁄ects of taxation, the more likely it is that majoritarian methods will yield a
determinant prediction for redistributive taxes.
Households in the model di⁄er in their initial wealth-holdings and in the productivity of their
labor e⁄ort. Inequality in these characteristics is calibrated to match stylized facts on the U.S.
distributions of wealth and wages. The most numerous household type in the calibrated model
has a population share of 47%, so no single type constitutes a majority of the electorate. The
political decision is made at date zero, under full commitment, on constant paths of taxes. Taxes
are used to ￿nance a redistributive transfer and an exogenous level of government purchases. I
focus on balanced growth equilibria in a version of the model calibrated roughly to U.S. data.
The main ￿nding of the paper is the inconclusiveness of majority voting methods for deriv-
ing empirically substantive restrictions on equilibrium tax rates. Under probabilistic voting, the
equilibrium tax vectors in the calibrated model prove to be extremely sensitive to assumptions on
the random, non-policy elements in household preferences. In particular, depending on whether
those elements enter household preferences additively or multiplicatively, the resulting equilibrium
tax vectors are nearly orthogonal. While one equilibrium supports signi￿cant transfers, the other
involves taxes that simply ￿nance exogenous government consumption.
From probabilistic voting, I turn to other majority-voting solution concepts. I ￿rst look at
the calibrated model￿ s Pareto set￿ the set of tax vectors which cannot be unanimously defeated
under majority voting. Given the sharp distortionary e⁄ects of taxes in the model￿ in particular
capital income taxes, given the AK structure￿ it￿ s reasonable to hope to e¢ ciency considerations
alone may signi￿cantly narrow the range of possible political outcomes, and in fact the Pareto set
is quite small relative to the entire issue space. However, comparing the Pareto set with average
tax rates on consumption and factor income for a set of 20 OECD countries, I ￿nd that the
Pareto set is nonetheless large relative to the wide variation in tax policies that we observe in the
data. A similar conclusion holds for the calibrated model￿ s uncovered set. Given the discrete grid
32of tax vectors on which I solve for the Pareto set and uncovered set, I ￿nd that no Condorcet
winner exists. If we think in terms of two-party electoral competition, a Condorcet winner would
constitute a dominant strategy for either candidate, while the uncovered set would constitute the
set of strategies which are not dominated. Neither of these criteria proves to have any empirical
bite.
One interpretation of these results is that, absent more structure on the political process, our
model economy, calibrated to match features of the U.S. economy, cannot decide whether it wants
a tax system like that of the U.S. or that of a European welfare state. As con￿rmation of this
interpretation, I consider the model￿ s predictions when the issue space consists of the tax vectors
for the 20 countries in the OECD data. In that case, I ￿nd that all 20 tax vectors are in the Pareto
set, 10 tax vectors are in the uncovered set, and no Condorcet winner exists. The 10 tax vectors
in the uncovered set run the gamut from the U.S. data to countries like Austria and Norway.
Majority preferences over those 10 alternatives are cyclic￿ one can construct a Condorcet cycle
involving all 10 alternatives.
The inconclusiveness of majority-voting methods in this context￿ in contrast to the sharp
results found in other papers in the literature on the endogenous determination of taxation and
redistribution￿ stems from the fact that the issue space is multi-dimensional and, at the same
time, no single voter type constitutes a majority of the electorate. It may be possible to deal with
the dimensionality problem by imposing a sequential structure on voting, with one issue being
decided at a time. But to do so in a way that is not simply ad hoc, one would, I think, need to
specify procedures that were consistent with real-world political processes (or prove an irrelevance
result). In order to see what we might conclude more generally, I￿ ve tried in this paper to avoid
specifying such processes, except in the broadest terms.
One might also try to take seriously the probabilistic voting framework, and deal with the
fragility of those results by justifying, empirically, a particular speci￿cation for the form and
distribution of the random, non-policy elements in households￿preferences. But here again, one
has to get into the nitty gritty of real-world politics.
Finally, the whole set of problems can be dispensed with simply by modeling the population
in such a way that, for each political decision taken, there is a household type that constitutes a
majority of the electorate. Whether this is a reasonable assumption is open to argument. Less
open to argument is whether it is an innocuous assumption, and the results in this paper seem to
suggest that it is not.
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A Appendix
A.1 The household￿ s intertemporal problem
Let M (kt;kt+1;:::) denote the household￿ s maximized value of cl , given kt, kt+1 and everything
else (prices, government policy variables, and the household￿ s value of e, represented by the ￿ ...￿ ),
in the case where the l ￿ 1 constraint is not binding. In terms of the equations in section 2.2, we




(1 +  )(1 + ￿c)
￿￿
 
(1 +  )(1 ￿ ￿n)wte
￿ 
￿
[((1 ￿ ￿k)rt + (1 ￿ ￿)qt)kt + (1 ￿ ￿n)wte + Tt ￿ qtkt+1]
1+  .
Let ^ M (kt;kt+1;:::) be de￿ned similarly, for the case where l = 1, i.e.,
^ M (kt;kt+1;:::) =
1
1 + ￿c
[((1 ￿ ￿k)rt + (1 ￿ ￿)qt)kt + Tt ￿ qtkt+1].
As discussed in the text, along a balanced growth path, the l ￿ 1 constraint for a given household
will either bind in every period or be slack in every period￿ i.e., the right-hand side of (13) will be
positive for some (e;s) types and negative for others, but will always consist of constants along a
balanced path. Conversely, while it may be feasible for a household to choose a path of capital that
makes the constraint binding in one period and slack in another, such paths necessarily involve
non-constant growth rates for the household￿ s capital stock, hence are inconsistent with balanced
growth.24 To characterize balanced growth equilibria, then, it su¢ ces to consider the household￿ s
24To see this, one need simply consider the Euler equation that arises from perturbing kt+1 in ￿￿￿ +
￿tM (kt;kt+1;:::) + ￿t+1 ^ M (kt+1;kt+2;:::) + ￿￿￿.
35intertemporal problem when either M (kt;kt+1;:::) is always relevant or ^ M (kt;kt+1;:::) is always
relevant.
The Euler equations for a constrained household take the form
qt ^ M (kt;kt+1;:::)
￿1=" = ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿k)rt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)qt+1] ^ M (kt+1;kt+2;:::)
￿1="
or (taking account of the de￿nition of ^ M and re-arranging slightly)
[(1 ￿ ￿k)rt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)qt+1]kt+1 + Tt+1 ￿ qt+1kt+2 (25)
=
￿
￿ [(1 ￿ ￿k)rt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)qt+1]
qt
￿"
([(1 ￿ ￿k)rt + (1 ￿ ￿)qt]kt + Tt ￿ qtkt+1).
Note that if qt+1=qt is constant and rt+1=qt+1 = A,
￿
￿ [(1 ￿ ￿k)rt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)qt+1]
qt
￿"
= ((1 + gq)[(1 ￿ ￿k)A + 1 ￿ ￿])
" ￿ 1 + ￿. (26)
If Tt grows at rate ￿ the Euler equation (25) reduces to
(1 + gq)[(1 ￿ ￿k)A + 1 ￿ ￿]qt+1kt+1 ￿ qt+2kt+2 (27)
= (1 + ￿)((1 + gq)[(1 ￿ ￿k)A + 1 ￿ ￿]qtkt ￿ qt+1kt+1)
which is satis￿ed if qtkt grows at rate ￿ as well. With Tt and qtkt growing at rate ￿, the household￿ s
budget constraint implies that ct grows at rate ￿ as well.
The Euler equations for an unconstrained household are somewhat more complicated than
(25). Assuming, as above, that qt+1=qt is constant, that rt+1=qt+1 = A and that ￿ is as de￿ned
in (26), and after cancelling constants from both sides, we obtain
w
￿
t+1 ([(1 ￿ ￿k)A + 1 ￿ ￿]qt+1kt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿n)wt+1e + Tt+1 ￿ qt+1kt+2)
1￿￿
= (1 + ￿) ￿ w
￿
t ([(1 ￿ ￿k)A + 1 ￿ ￿]qtkt + (1 ￿ ￿n)wte + Tt ￿ qtkt+1)
1￿￿
where ￿ ￿   (" ￿ 1). Suppose now that both Tt and wt grow at rate ￿. The last expression
then reduces to (27), from which it follows that a path of capital such that qtkt grows at rate
￿ is a solution. Again, the household￿ s budget constraint implies that ￿ is the growth rate of
consumption.
A.2 Balanced growth equilibrium
Given household budget constraints and the economy￿ s resource constraints, a balanced growth
equilibrium must have (a) N and ￿ constant (since they are bounded between 0 and 1); (b)
36consumption￿ at the household level and in the aggregate, private and public￿ growing at a
constant rate gZ, which is shared by the wage rate, transfer payment and the value of capital;
(c) individual and aggregate capital stocks growing at a constant rate gK; (d) the relative price
of capital and the rental rate growing at a common rate gq. The values of N and ￿, and the
three growth rates, must be consistent with household and ￿rm optimization and the economy￿ s
resource constraints.
The discussion of a typical household￿ s intertemporal optimization problem in the last section
showed that when the zero pro￿t condition qtA = rt held and qt grew at a constant rate gq, there
was a growth rate ￿ that, if shared by wt and Tt, implied that households chose paths of capital
such that qtkt grew at rate ￿ as well, and that household consumption grew at rate ￿ also. That
￿ will be the consumption growth rate gZ in balanced growth equilibrium.
Using equation (26), we have
1 + gZ = ((1 + gq)[(1 ￿ ￿k)A + 1 ￿ ￿])
" .
From the technology for producing Z, we know that 1 + gZ = (1 + gK)
￿, and so if qtkt is to
grow at gZ, it must be the case that 1 + gq = (1 + gK)
￿￿1 = (1 + gZ)
1￿ 1
￿. This pins down the
equilibrium consumption growth rate as
1 + g￿
Z = [(1 ￿ ￿k)A + 1 ￿ ￿]
￿"
￿+"(1￿￿) .
Since qtA = rt, ￿rms are indi⁄erent about their choice of ￿, so we may set ￿￿ to be consistent with
1 + g￿
Z = (1 + gK)
￿ = [A(1 ￿ ￿) + 1 ￿ ￿]
￿ ,
using Kt+1=Kt = A(1 ￿ ￿) + 1 ￿ ￿. This determines ￿￿.
To determine N￿, we turn to the decision rules governing household labor supply. Recall that
a household which supplies a positive amount of e⁄ective labor hours supplies
ent =
1
1 +  
e ￿
 
1 +  
(1 ￿ ￿k)rtkt + Tt ￿ qt [kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)kt]
(1 ￿ ￿n)wt
. (28)
units of e⁄ective labor. Moreover, the households which supply a positive amount of hours are
precisely those for which the right-hand side of the last equation is positive. Using rt = ￿Zt=￿￿Kt,
wt = (1 ￿ ￿)Zt=N, qt = rt=A, and the feature of a balanced growth equilibrium that kt+1 =
(1 + gK)kt = [A(1 ￿ ￿￿) + 1 ￿ ￿]kt, we can derive















￿k￿=￿￿ + ￿n (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿c (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿
(1 ￿ ￿n)(1 ￿ ￿)
N. (30)
Substituting (29) and (30) into (28)￿ and taking account of the fact that in a balanced growth
equilibrium, kt=Kt = k0=K0 = s￿ we obtain the expression which was claimed in section 2.4 to be
the labor supply of an unconstrained household along a balanced growth path, for a given value
of aggregate e⁄ective labor supply N:
1
1 +  
e ￿
 
1 +  
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿k
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿n)
￿
￿￿s +
￿k￿=￿￿ + ￿n (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿c (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿
(1 ￿ ￿n)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
N,
As discussed in the text, denoting the last expression by ￿(e;s;N;￿), the equilibrium value of





At any date t along the balanced growth path, K￿











t ), and q￿
t = r￿
t=A. Household choices obey ct (e;s) =
(1 + gZ)
t c0 (e;s), kt (e;s) = (1 + gK)




(1 +  )(1 + ￿c)
f(￿￿ ￿ ￿k)r￿





(1 +  )(1 ￿ ￿n)w￿
0e
f(￿￿ ￿ ￿k)r￿
0s + (1 ￿ ￿n)w￿
0e + T0g,







l0 (e;s) = 1.
We can substitute T0 out of these expressions, noting that in equilibrium
T0 = [￿k (￿=￿￿) + ￿n (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿c (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿]Z￿
0:
These are the expressions used to construct c0 (e;s)l0 (e;s)
  in the derivation of households￿
preferences over policies in section 4.1.
38A.3 Parameter restrictions to guarantee solutions to the household￿ s
problem
As in many models of economic growth, the key parameter restrictions necessary to guarantee
existence of solutions to the households￿intertemporal problems take the form of a Brock-Gale-
type condition that relates the growth rate of consumption, the discount factor and the curvature
of the utility function. The condition in our case is
￿ (1 + gZ)
1￿ 1
" < 1.
With 1 + gZ = [A(1 ￿ ￿) + 1 ￿ ￿]
￿, this condition becomes
￿ [A(1 ￿ ￿) + 1 ￿ ￿]
￿(1￿ 1
") < 1. (31)
We want to restrict the parameters ￿, A, ￿, ￿ and " such that this inequality can be attained for
￿ between zero and one. In our calibrated model " < 1, so [A(1 ￿ ￿) + 1 ￿ ￿]
￿(1￿ 1
") is maximized
when ￿ = 1. If, therefore,
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿(1￿ 1
") < 1,
then (31) will be satis￿ed at all values of ￿ 2 [0;1]. For our calibrated model, ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿(1￿ 1
") ￿ =
0:86, so the condition is satis￿ed. Note, too, that when (31) holds, households￿transversality
conditions are automatically satis￿ed in a balanced growth equilibrium.
A.4 Calibrating the model
In the two-sector AK model used in this paper, key ratios like labor￿ s share of national income
or consumption￿ s share of output depend on the economy￿ s balanced growth rate, which in turn
depends on the rate of capital income taxation. Also, as in the neoclassical growth model, the
balanced growth allocation of hours to work and leisure depends on both the labor income tax
rate and the consumption tax rate. Therefore, I calibrate the model to generate a particular
balanced growth path￿ meeting the targets in Table 2￿ for a speci￿c set of taxes ￿ ￿ = (￿ ￿c;￿ ￿n;￿ ￿k).
In particular I take ￿ ￿ to be the vector of tax rates for the U.S. as given in Table 1. For simplicity,
I will refer to the balanced growth path associated with this vector of taxes as the ￿ benchmark
equilibrium￿ .
Let sc and sg denote the output shares of private and government consumption, and let sn


















Thus, target values for sc and sg imply a value for ￿.
From the expression for national income, (4), and using the ￿rst-order condition wt = (1 ￿ ￿)Zt=Nt,
labor￿ s share of national income can be written as
sn =
1 ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿
￿
. (32)
Using Ct + Gt = Zt, the consumption goods￿share of output can be written as
sc + sg =
1
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿
￿
. (33)
Note that both shares depend on ￿ which describes the allocation of capital between the consumption-
producing and capital-producing sectors.
Given target values for sn, sc and sg, (32) and (33) constitute two equations in the two
unknowns ￿ and ￿. Their solution is





sc + sg ￿ sn
1 ￿ sn
.
The solution for ￿ is our calibration of that parameter, given targets values for the si￿ s. ￿, of
course, is an endogenous variable, so the solution for ￿ is a value that must hold in the benchmark
equilibrium if that equilibrium is to have consumption and labor income shares that match the
target values. Call the particular value of ￿ given by the last equation ￿ ￿. The other parameters
of the model must be such that ￿ = ￿ ￿ holds in the benchmark equilibrium.
Assuming that ￿ = ￿ ￿, the growth rate of capital in the benchmark equilibrium is
1 + gK ￿
Kt+1
Kt
= A(1 ￿ ￿ ￿) + 1 ￿ ￿.
As described in section 3, the depreciation rate ￿ is set to be 0:10, without regard to the benchmark
equilibrium. Since the consumption growth rate obeys 1 + gZ = (1 + gK)
￿, we can derive the
following expression for A:
A =
(1 + gZ)
1=￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿ ￿
.
Given ￿, ￿ and ￿ ￿, this value of A implies that consumption growth in the benchmark equilibrium
40will match the target rate gZ.
The last step for this group of parameters is to give a condition on ￿, the discount factor, so
that ￿ ￿ is in fact chosen in the benchmark equilibrium. We may write a typical household￿ s Euler
equation in the benchmark equilibrium as
(1 + gZ)
1=" = ￿ (1 + gq)[(1 ￿ ￿ ￿k)A + 1 ￿ ￿].
The left-hand side is consumption growth, with exponent equal to the inverse of the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution. The right-hand side is ￿ times the return to investment in capital. As
shown in section 2.1, 1 + gZ = (1 + gK)
￿ and 1 + gq = (1 + gK)
￿￿1, so we may write
[A(1 ￿ ￿ ￿) + 1 ￿ ￿]
￿="+1￿￿ = ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿ ￿k)A + 1 ￿ ￿].
Since ", like ￿, has been set exogenously, all the parameters in the equation but ￿ are ￿xed.
Fixing the parameter ￿ equal to the value that satis￿es this equation guarantees ￿ ￿ is chosen in
the benchmark equilibrium.
The remaining parameter to be set is  , which a⁄ects the household￿ s allocation of time between
leisure and working. As described in section 3, I calibrate   as if all households were aggregated
into a representative household￿ that is, as if there were a household with consumption equal to
aggregate consumption and hours worked equal to aggregate hours worked. The intratemporal





1 ￿ ￿ ￿n
1 + ￿ ￿c
wt.
Using Ct = (1 ￿ ￿)Zt and wt = (1 ￿ ￿)Zt=N, we have
  =
￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿n









Given ￿, ￿, ￿ ￿n and ￿ ￿c, and setting N equal to its target value of 0:30, the last expression gives






















The model's Pareto set (blue circles), together with the 
data from Table 1 (red diamonds). Tax rates are in percent.













































The model's uncovered set (blue circles), together with the 
data from Table 1 (red diamonds). Tax rates are in percent.








































































Histogram showing the frequency of transfer rates associated 
with the tax vectors in the uncovered set of Figure 2
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